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Court disagreed, and stated that "we are
satisfied that the consuming public
understands that licenses... are issued
by governmental authorities and that a
host of certificates... are issued by private organizations." ld. at 228Q.
In balancing the State's interest in
avoiding misleading consumers with the
cost of completely banning advertisements of certification, the Court found
that less burdensome alternatives
existed The State could create initial
screening criteria for certifying organizations or require disclaimers on attorney
advertisements about the organizations
or their standards. ld. at 2292-93.
It is interesting to note that Rule 2105( a)( 3) allows for attorneys to advertise specialties in patent or trademark
law. The Court stated that a complete
ban on advertising certifications by the
state would be undermined by allowing
such exceptions. ld. at 2291.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, argued that
the State had a legitimate interest in
regulating abuse in attorney advertising
and that the public could be readily
misled by the juxtaposition on the letterhead of petitioner's licensing and his
NBTA certification. Therefore, consumers could mistakenly conclude that
Peel's services were of higher quality
because of his certification and that the
State had approved the certification. ld.
at 2300 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). As
such a misleading advertisement, the
State had the authority to prevent Peel
from advertising his certification. ld. at
2301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In Peel v. Illinois, the United States
Supreme Court upheld an attorney's
right to advertise his certification under
the first amendment commercial
speech standards. States may regulate
advertising certifications but may not
ban their use altogether. Future advertising by attorneys of their certifications
might, therefore, be required to meet
minimum state screening requirements
or be forced to include restricting language such as disclaimers.
-JoanOcboa

Pennsylvania v. Muniz: VIDEOTAPED EVIDENCE CAN BE
ADMITTED AT THE CRIMINAL
TRIALS OF DRUNK DRIVERS
In the drunk driving case of Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 ( 1990),
the United States Supreme Court held
that evidence obtained by way of videotape was admissible because the questions fell within the "routine booking"
exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). The Court also refused
to suppress parts of the videotaped evidence concerning statements made during processing, since they were voluntary and not made during custodial
interrogation.
Inocencio Muniz was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol
and transported to a booking center
after failing three standard field sobriety
tests. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642. In line
with police procedure, the proceedings
at the booking center were videotaped.
The attending officer first asked Muniz
the standard questions, including his
name, address, height, weight, eye color,
date of birth, and current age, to which
Muniz stumbled over several responses.
The officer then asked Muniz ifhe knew
the date of his sixth birthday which
Muniz was unable to provide. Finally,
Muniz performed the three sobriety
tests that he failed earlier and was
requested to submit to a breathalyzer
test, at which time he made several
incriminating statements. ld. When
Muniz refused to take the breath test, he
was advised of his Miranda rights for the
first time. The videotape of the proceedings was admitted into evidence at his
bench trial. Muniz was subsequently
convicted of driving under the influence
of alcohol. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed his conviction, holding
that once Muniz was arrested and taken
into custody, all utterances and responses were clearly compelled by the
questions presented him during the
booking proceedings. Therefore, the
Court concluded that his responses and
communications were elicited before
he received his Miranda warnings and
should have been suppressed. ld. at
2643.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether various incriminating utterances of a drunk driving suspect, made while performing a series of
sobriety tests, constitute testimonial re-

sponses to custodial interrogation for
purposes of the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. ld. Eight justices
agreed that most of the statements admitted into evidence did not violate the
accused's fifth amendment rights, although three reached this conclusion
under a different analysis.
The majority opinion began with a
discussion of the types of evidence a
suspect could not be compelled to produce. The Court noted that Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held
that the self-incrimination clause did
not protect a suspect from being compelled to produce "real or physical evidence." Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2643. Yet
the clause did protect an accused from
being compelled to provide evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature.
Id.

Furthermore, since the utterances
were made prior to Muniz's receiving
his Miranda warnings, the Court also
focused on the "informal compulsion
exerted by the law enforcement officers
during in-custody questioning." ld. at
2644 ( quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
u.s. 436,461 (1966». Thus, the Court
concluded that the case implicated both
the "testimonial" and "compulsion" components of the privilege against selfincrimination in the context of pretrial
questioning. ld.
Next, the Court addressed Muniz's responses to the initial questions regarding name, address, weight, eye color,
date ()fbirth, and current age. Although
MLJniz's responses were incriminating,
to violate th~ self-incrimination clause,
they must have been either testimonial
or elicited by custodial interrogation. ld.
"In order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication must itself, explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information." ld. at 2646 ( quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
210 ( 1988) ). In comparison, the Court
cited numerous types of evidence held
not to be testimonial including fingerprinting, photographing, appearing in
court, standing, walking, writing, speaking, and being forced to provide a blood
sample. Finally, the Court concluded
that testimonial evidence encompasses
all responses that, if asked of a sworn
suspect during a criminal trial, would
place the suspect in the cruel trilemma
of self accusation, perjury, or contempt.
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Id. at 2648. Thus, the statements were
not testimonial. Id. at 2649.
However, the Court concluded that
when Muniz was asked whether he
knew the date of his sixth birthday, he
was confronted with the cruel trilemma
in a coercive environment created by
the custodial interrogation. Id. Since his
answer was testimonial, it should have
been suppressed.
The Court then addressed the State's
argument that the initial questioning
period did not constitute custodial interrogation or its "functional equivalent."
Id. at 2650. In Rbode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court
defined the "functional equivalent" of
interrogation as "any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650. Finding that
custodial interrogation did exist, it nonetheless held Muniz's answers regarding
name, address, weight, eye color, date of
birth, and current age admissible as falling within the newly adopted "routine
booking" exception, established in
United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180
(8th Cir. 1989), which exempts questions to secure the information necessary to complete booking or pretrial
services. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2650.
Muniz made additional statements
while performing three sobriety tests
and while deciding not to take a breathalyzer test. Yet, the Court noted, the
statements were made in response to
carefully scripted instructions not intended to elicit any verbal responses. Id.
at 2651. Therefore, the officer's words
or actions did not constitute interrogation and even the questions requesting a
response were merely "attendant to"
legitimate police procedure. Id. Hence,
Muniz's statements were made voluntarilyand thus were admissible. Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a
concurring opinion, agreed that the
statements made when the accused was
asked the date of his sixth birthday,
should not have been suppressed. This
result was premised on the grounds that
if the police may require Muniz to use
his body in order to demonstrate the
level of his physical coordination, they
should be able to require him to speak
or write in order to determine mental
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coordination.Id. at 2653 (Rehnquist, C.
J., concurring). Rehnquist disagreed
with the recognition of a routine booking exception to Miranda. He felt the
"booking" questions were not testimonial so there was no need to apply the
privilege. Id. at 2654 (Rehnquist, C. ).,
concurring).
Justice Marshall, the sole dissenter,
agreed with the majority that Muniz's
response to the question regarding the
date of his sixth birthday should have
been suppressed as the question constituted custodial interrogation prior to
receipt of Miranda warnings. Id.(Marshall,}., dissenting). He disagreed, however, with the recognition of the routine
booking exception and believed the
Court had misapplied the Innis test
when considering custodial interrogation.Id. at 2655-56 (Marshall,}., dissenting). Marshall believed the routine
booking exception would necessitate
difficult, time consuming litigation over
whether particular questions were routine, necessary for recordkeeping and
designed to elicit incriminating testimony. Id. at 2655 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It is apparent that the Supreme Court
will continue their conservative outlook
with regard to drunk driving prosecutions. As illustrated by this case, if evidence is not obtained by way of custodial interrogation or falls within the
routine booking exception to Miranda,
the courts will allow evidence obtained
by way of videotape.
- Freddie] Traub

Wi/Iiams v. Wi/zack: MARYLAND
STATUTE ALLOWING
INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
ME NT ALLY ILL PATIENTS TO
BE FORCIBLY MEDICATED
VIOLATED PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
In Williams v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485,
573 A.2d 809 (1990), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that § 10-708
of the Maryland Health-General Article,
which established procedures for medicating mentally ill patients against their
will, lacked the requisite procedural
due process protections guaranteed by
the state and federal constitutions. Although the decision did not render the
statute unconstitutional, it potentially
did weaken the ability of psychiatrists to
forcibly medicate possibly dangerous

patients, even if such medication is
approved by a clinical review panel.
Laquinn Williams was committed to a
state mental hospital after a judicial
determination that he was not criminally responsible. See Md. Health-Gen.
Code Ann. § 12-108 (1990). After Williams was diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic, his doctor prescribed treatment with an antipsychotic drug. Williams objected to taking the medication
for fear it would disrupt his thought
process, interfere with the exercise of
his Sunni Muslim religion, and reduce
his ability to assist his attorney in a subsequent release hearing. Id. at 490,573
A.2d at 811. A clinical review panel was
convened to review William's decision.
Williams and his lawyer were allowed to
be present for part of the hearing so that
Williams could explain his reasons for
objecting. The panel, however, unanimously determined that the medication
was the least intrusive way to effectively
treat Williams and ordered that he be
forcibly medicated. Id. at 490,573 A.2d
at 811. Williams was medicated against
his will for approximately two weeks
until he stated his plans to obtain an
injunction to prohibit the medication.
The medication was, therefore, temporarily discontinued and another review
panel was convened. This second review
panel also unanimously recommended
that Williams be forcibly medicated. Id.
at 491,573 A.2d at 812.
Williams filed an action in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County alleging
that the procedures under § 10-708 violated his state and federal constitutional
rights to privacy, due process, freedom
of speech, thought, and religion. Id. The
trial court determined that § 10-708 was
both constitutional on its face and as
applied. As such, the court granted the
State's motion for summary judgment
and denied William's motion for partial
summary judgment. Williams appealed,
and the court of appeals granted certiorari before the court of special appeals
decided the case. Id. at 492, 573 A.2d at
812.
The court of appeals initially explained that without § 10-708, the common law rule as set forth in Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014
( 1977) would apply. The Sard rule
required that a physician obtain a patient's consent before he treated a patient in a non-emergency situation. Wil-

